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Abstract
Congestion games are a classical type of games studied in game theory, in which n players choose a
resource, and their individual cost increases with the number of other players choosing the same
resource. In network congestion games (NCGs), the resources correspond to simple paths in a graph,
e.g. representing routing options from a source to a target. In this paper, we introduce a variant of
NCGs, referred to as dynamic NCGs: in this setting, players take transitions synchronously, they
select their next transitions dynamically, and they are charged a cost that depends on the number
of players simultaneously using the same transition.
We study, from a complexity perspective, standard concepts of game theory in dynamic NCGs:
social optima, Nash equilibria, and subgame perfect equilibria. Our contributions are the following:
the existence of a strategy profile with social cost bounded by a constant is in PSPACE and NP-hard.
(Pure) Nash equilibria always exist in dynamic NCGs; the existence of a Nash equilibrium with
bounded cost can be decided in EXPSPACE, and computing a witnessing strategy profile can be done
in doubly-exponential time. The existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium with bounded cost can be
decided in 2EXPSPACE, and a witnessing strategy profile can be computed in triply-exponential time.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory; Theory of
computation→ Formal languages and automata theory; Theory of computation→ Solution concepts
in game theory; Theory of computation → Verification by model checking
Keywords and phrases Congestion games, Nash equilibria, Subgame perfect equilibria, Complexity
Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs...
1 Introduction
Congestion games model selfish resource sharing among several players [19]. A special case
is the one of network congestion games, in which players aim at routing traffic through a
congested network. Their popularity is certainly due to the fact that they have important
practical applications, whether in transportation networks, or in large communication
networks [18]. In network congestion games, each player chooses a set of transitions, forming
a simple path from a source state to a target state, and the cost of a transition increases
with its load, that is, with the number of players using it.
Network congestion games can be classified into atomic and non-atomic variants. Non-
atomic semantics is appropriate for large populations of players, thus seen as a continuum.
One then considers portions of the population that apply predefined strategies, and there
is no such thing as the effect of an individual player on the cost of others. In contrast, in
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XX:2 Dynamic network congestion games
atomic games, the number of players is fixed, and each player may significantly impact the
cost other players incur. We only focus on atomic games in this paper.
Network congestion games. Network congestion games, also called atomic selfish routing
games in the literature, were first considered by Rosenthal [19]. These games are defined by a
directed graph, a number of pairs of source-target vertices, and non-decreasing cost functions
for each edge in the graph. For each source-target pair, a player must choose a route from
the source to the target vertex. Given their choice of simple paths, the cost incurred by a
player depends on the number of other players that choose paths sharing edges with their
path, and on the cost functions of these edges. In this setting, a Nash equilibrium maps
each player to a path in such a way that no player has an incentive to deviate: they cannot
decrease their cost by choosing a different path.
Rosenthal proved that they are potential games, so that Nash equilibria always exist.
Monderer and Shapley [16] studied in a more general way potential games, and explained
how to iteratively use best-response strategies to converge to an equilibrium. Interestingly,
under reasonable assumptions on the cost functions, Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis established
that there is a direct correspondence between equilibria in selfish routing and distributed
shortest-path routing, which is used in practice for packet routing in computer networks [6].
We refer the interested reader to [20] for an introduction and many basic results on general
routing games.
A natural question is whether selfish routing is very different from a routing strategy
decided by a centralized authority. In other words, how far can a selfish optimum be from
the social optimum, in which players would cooperate. The notion of price of anarchy, first
proposed by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [13], is the ratio of the worst cost of a Nash
equilibrium and the cost of the social optimum. This measures how bad Nash equilibria
can be. In the context of network congestion games, the price of anarchy was first studied by
Suri et al. [21], establishing an upper bound of 52 when all cost functions are affine. A refined
upper bound was provided by Awerbuch et al. [5]. Bounds on the dual notion of price of
stability, which is the ratio of the cost of a best Nash equilibrium and the cost of the social
optimum was also studied for routing games [1].
Timing aspects. Several works investigated refinements of this setting. In [10], the authors
study network congestion games in which each edge is traversed with a fixed duration
independent of its load, while the cost of each edge depends on the load. The model is
thus said to have time-dependent costs since the load depends on the times at which players
traverse a given edge. The authors prove the existence of Nash equilibria by reduction to the
setting of [19]. An extension of this setting with timed constraints was studied in [2, 3].
The setting of fixed durations with time-dependent costs is interesting in applications
where the players sharing a resource (an edge) see their quality of services decrease, while
the time to use the resource is unaffected [3]. Timing also appears, for instance, in [17, 14]
where the load affects travel times and players’ objective is to minimize the total travel time.
Other works focus on flow models with a timing aspect [12, 7].
Dynamic network congestion games. In classical network congestion games, including
those mentioned above, players choose their strategies (i.e., their simple paths) in one shot.
However, it may be interesting to let agents choose their paths dynamically, that is, step by
step, by observing other players’ previous choices. In this paper, we study network congestion
games with time-dependent costs as in [10], but with unit delays, and in a dynamic setting.
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More precisely, at each step, each of the players simultaneously selects the edge they want to
take; each player is then charged a cost that depends on the load of the edge they selected,
and traverses that edge in one step. We name these games dynamic network congestion
games (dynamic NCGs in short); the behaviour of the players in such games is formalized by
means of strategies, telling the players what to play depending of the current configuration.
Notice that, because congestion effect applies to edges used simultaneously by several players,
taking cycles can be interesting in dynamic NCGs, which makes our setting more complex
than most NCG models [4, 10, 19, 20].
Such a dynamic setting was studied in [4] for resource allocation games, which extends [19]
with dynamic choices. A more detailed related work appears at the end of this section.
Standard solution concepts. We study classical solution concepts on dynamic network
congestion games. A strategy profile (i.e., a function assigning a strategy to each player) is a
Nash Equilibrium (NE) when each single strategy is an optimal response to the strategies
of the other players; in other terms, under such a strategy profile, no player may lower
their costs by unilaterally changing their strategies. Notice that NEs need not exist in
general, and when they exist, they may not be unique. In the setting of dynamic games,
Nash Equilibria are usually enforced using punishing strategies, by which any deviating player
will be punished by all other players once the deviation has been detected. However, such
punishing strategies may also increase the cost incurred to the punishing players, and hence
do not form a credible threat; Subgame-Perfect Equilibria (SPEs) refine NEs and address
this issue by requiring that the strategy profile is an NE along any play.
NEs and SPEs aim at minimizing the individual cost of each player (without caring of
the others’ costs); in a collaborative setting, the players may instead try to lower the social
cost, i.e., the sum of the costs incurred to all the players. Strategy profiles achieving this are
called social optima (SO). Obviously, the social cost of NEs and SPEs cannot be less than
that of the social optimum; the price of anarchy measures how bad selfish behaviours may
be compared to collaborative ones.
Our contributions. We take a computational-complexity viewpoint to study dynamic
network congestion games. We first establish the complexity of computing the social
optimum, which we show is in PSPACE and NP-hard. We then prove that best-response
strategies can be computed in polynomial time, and that dynamic NCGs are potential games,
thereby showing the existence of Nash equilibria in any dynamic NCG; this also shows
that some Nash equilibrium can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time. We then give an
EXPSPACE (resp. 2EXPSPACE) algorithm to decide the existence of Nash Equilibria (resp.
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria) whose costs satisfy given bounds. This allows us to compute
best and worst such equilibria, and then the price of anarchy and the price of stability.
Note that some of the high complexities follow from the binary encoding of the number of
players, which is the main input parameter. For instance, the exponential-space complexity
drops to pseudo-polynomial time for a fixed number of players. This parameter becomes
important since we advocate the study of computational problems, such as computing Nash
equilibria with a given cost bound. We also believe that computing precise values for price
of anarchy and the price of stability is interesting, rather than providing bounds on the set
of all instances as in e.g. [21].
Comparison with related work. The works closest to our setting are [10, 4, 2, 3]. As in [10,
3], we establish the existence of Nash equilibria using potential games. Unlike [10], we cannot
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obtain this result immediately by reducing our games to congestion games [19] since the
lengths of the strategies cannot be bounded a priori. Moreover, the best-response problem
has a polynomial-time solution in our setting while the problem is NP-hard both in [10, 3].
In [10], this is due to the possibility of having arbitrary durations, while the source of
complexity in [2, 3] is due to the use of timed automata. Thus, our setting offers a simpler
way of expressing timings, and avoids their high complexity for this problem.
Dynamic choices were studied in [4] but with a different cost model. Moreover, network
congestion games can only be reduced to such a setting given an a priori bound on the length
of the paths. So we cannot directly transfer any of their results to our setting. Dynamic
choices were also studied in [10] in the setting of coordination mechanisms which are local
policies that allow one to sequentialize traffic on the edges.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Dynamic network congestion games
src
v1
v2
v3 tgt
x
7→ x
x 7→
5
x 7→ 6
x 7→
3x
x
7→ x
x 7→ 4x
Figure 1 Representation of an arena for
a dynamic NCG (loop omitted on tgt)
Let F be the family of non-decreasing functions
from N to N that are piecewise-affine, with finitely
many pieces. We assume that each f ∈ F is rep-
resented by the endpoints of intervals, and the
coefficients, all encoded in binary. An arena for
dynamic network congestion games is a weighted
graphA = 〈V,E, src, tgt〉, where V is a finite set of
states, E : V × V → F is a partial function defin-
ing the cost of edges, and src and tgt are a source-
and a target state in V . It is assumed throughout
this paper that tgt has only a single outgoing transition, which is a self-loop with constant
cost function x 7→ 0. We also assume that tgt is reachable from all other states.
A dynamic network congestion game (dynamic NCG for short) is a pair G = 〈A, n〉 where
A is an arena as above and n ∈ N is the (binary-encoded) number of players. In a dynamic
network congestion game, all players start from src and simultaneously select the edges
they want to traverse, with the aim of reaching the target state with minimal individual
accumulated cost. Taking an edge e = (v, f, v′) has a cost f(l), where l is the number of
players simultaneously using edge e. The cost function of edge e is denoted by fe. We let
κ = maxe∈E fe(n), which is the maximal cost that a player may endure along one edge.
Our setting differs from classical network congestion games [20] mainly in two respects:
first, the game is played in rounds, during which all players take exactly one transition;
the number of players using an edge e is measured dynamically, at each round;
second, during the play, players may adapt their choices to what the other players have
been doing in the previous rounds.
I Remark 1. In this work, we mainly focus on the symmetric case, where all players have the
same source and target. This is because we take a parametric-verification point of view, with
the (long-term) aim of checking properties of dynamic NCGs for arbitrarily many players.
An important consequence of this choice is that the number of players now is encoded in
binary, which results in an exponential blow-up in the number of configurations of the game
(compared to the asymmetric setting).
N. Bertrand, N. Markey, S. Sadhukhan, O. Sankur XX:5
Semantics as a concurrent game. For any k ∈ N, we write JkK = {i ∈ N | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}.
A configuration of a dynamic network congestion game 〈A, n〉 is a mapping c : JnK→ V ,
indicating the position of each player in the arena. We define csrc : i ∈ JnK 7→ src and
ctgt : i ∈ JnK 7→ tgt as the initial and target configurations, respectively.
With 〈A, n〉, we first associate a multi-weighted graphM = 〈C, T 〉, where C = V JnK is
the set of all configurations and T ⊆ C ×NJnK ×C is a set of edges, defined as follows: there
is an edge (c, w, c′) in T if, and only if, there exists a collection e = (ei)i∈JnK of edges of E
such that for all i ∈ JnK, writing ei = (vi, fi, v′i) and ui = #{j ∈ JnK | ej = ei}, we have
c(i) = vi, c′(i) = v′i, and w(i) = fi(ui). We denote this edge with c
e=⇒ c′. We may omit to
mention e since it can be obtained from c and c′; similarly, we write costi(c, c′) for w(i).
Two edges (c, w, c′) and (d, x, d′), in that order, are said to be consecutive whenever
d = c′. Given a configuration c, a path from c in a dynamic network congestion game is
either the single configuration c (we call this a trivial path) or a non-empty, finite or infinite
sequence of consecutive edges ρ = (tj)1≤j<|ρ| inM, where t1 is a transition from c; the size
of a path ρ is one for trivial paths, and |ρ| ∈ N ∪ {+∞} otherwise. We write Paths(〈A, n〉, c)
and Pathsω(〈A, n〉, c) for the set of finite and infinite paths from c in 〈A, n〉, respectively.
With each path ρ = (cj , wj , c′j)j , and each player i ∈ JnK, we associate a cost, written
costi(ρ), which is zero for trivial paths, +∞ for infinite paths along which cj(i) 6= tgt for
all j, and
∑|ρ|−1
j=1 wj(i) otherwise. We define the social cost of ρ, denoted by soccost(ρ), as∑
i∈JnK costi(ρ).
Given a path ρ, an index 1 ≤ j < |ρ|+ 1 and a player i ∈ JnK, we write ρ(j) for the j-th
configuration of ρ, and ρ(j)(i) for the state of Player i in that configuration. For j ≥ 2, we
define ρ≤j as the prefix of ρ that ends in the j-th configuration; we let ρ≤1 = ρ(1). Similarly,
for 1 ≤ j ≤ |ρ| − 1, we let ρ≥j denote the suffix that starts at the j-th configuration. Finally,
if |ρ| is finite, we let ρ≥|ρ| = ρ(|ρ|).
I Example 2. Consider the arena A displayed at Fig. 1 and the dynamic NCG 〈A, 2〉 with
two players. Assume that Player 1 follows the path pi1 : src→ v1 → v3 → tgt and Player 2
goes via pi2 : src→ v1 → v2 → v3 → tgt. This gives rise to the following path:(
1 7→ src
2 7→ src
) 1 7→2
2 7→2−−−→
(
1 7→ v1
2 7→ v1
) 1 7→3
2 7→6−−−→
(
1 7→ v3
2 7→ v2
) 1 7→4
2 7→1−−−→
(
1 7→ tgt
2 7→ v3
) 1 7→0
2 7→4−−−→
(
1 7→ tgt
2 7→ tgt
)
Notice how edge v3 → tgt of A is used by both players, but not simultaneously, so that the
cost of using that edge is 4 for each of them, while it would be 8 in classical NCGs. J
We now extend this graph to a concurrent game structure. A move for Player i ∈ JnK
from configuration c is an edge e = (v, f, v′) ∈ E such that v = c(i). A move vector from c is
a sequence e = (ei)i∈JnK such that for all i ∈ JnK, ei is a move for Player i from c.
A network congestion game 〈A, n〉 then gives rise to a concurrent game structure S =
〈C, T,M,U〉 where 〈C, T 〉 is the graph defined above, M : C × JnK → 2E lists the set of
possible moves for each player in each configuration, and U : C × EJnK → T is the transition
function, such that for every configuration c and every move vector e = (ei)i∈JnK with
ei ∈M(c, i) for all i ∈ JnK, U(c, e) = (c e=⇒ c′).
A strategy for Player i in S from configuration c is a function σi : Paths(〈A, n〉, c)→ E
that associates, with any finite path ρ from c in S, a move for this player from the last
configuration of ρ. A strategy profile is a family σ = (σi)i∈JnK of strategies, one for each
player. We write S for the set of strategies, and Sn for the set of strategy profiles.
Let c be a configuration, h be a finite path from c and a strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈JnK
from c. The residual strategy profile of σ after h is the strategy profile σh = (σhi )i∈JnK from
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the last configuration of h defined by σhi (h′) = σi(h · h′), where h · h′ is the concatenation of
paths h and h′.
The outcome of a strategy profile σ from c is the infinite path ρ = (ci, wi, ci+1)i≥1,
hereafter denoted with outcome(σ), obtained by running the strategy profile; it is formally
defined as the only infinite path such that (c1, w1, c2) = U(c, σ(c)), and such that for
any j ≥ 2, (cj , wj , cj+1) = U(cj , σ(h′)), where h′ = (c1, w1, c2) · · · (cj−1, wj−1, cj).
Pick a strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈JnK, and let ρ = (tj)j≥1 be its outcome, writing
tj = (cj , (wij)i∈JnK, c′j) for all j ≥ 1. Let k ∈ JnK. If c′l(k) = tgt for some l ∈ N, then σk
is said to be winning for Player k. In that case, we define costk(σ) as costk(outcome(σ)).
If c′l(i) = tgt for all i ∈ JnK, we define the social cost of σ as soccost(σ) = soccost(ρ).
A strategy σi for Player i is said blind whenever for any two finite paths ρ and ρ′ having
same length k, if for any position 0 ≤ j < k we have ρ(j)(i) = ρ′(j)(i), then σi(ρ) = σi(ρ′).
Intuitively, this means that strategy σi follows a path in A, independently of what the other
players do. A blind strategy can thus be represented as a path and we write |σi| for the length
of that path (until its first visit to tgt, if any). We write B for the set of blind strategies.
I Example 3. Consider again the arena A of Fig. 1. The paths pi1 and pi2 from Example 2 are
two blind strategies in that dynamic NCG. In a 2-player setting, an example of a non-blind
strategy σ consists in first taking the transition src→ v1, and then either taking v1 → v3 if
the other player took the same initial transition, or taking v1 → v2 otherwise. J
Representation as a weighted graph. Another way of representing configurations is to
consider their Parikh images. With a configuration c ∈ V JnK, we associate an abstract
configuration c¯ ∈ JnKV defined as c¯(v) = #{i ∈ JnK | c(i) = v}.
The abstract weighted graph associated with a dynamic network congestion game 〈A, n〉
is the weighted graph P = 〈A,B〉, where A contains all abstract configurations, and there is
an edge (a,w, a′) in B ⊆ A×N×A if, and only if, there is a mapping b : E → JnK such that∑
e∈E b(e) = n and for all v ∈ V ,
a(v) =
∑
e=(v,f,v′)
b(e) w =
∑
e=(v,f,v′)
b(e)× f(b(e)) a′(v) =
∑
e=(v′,f,v)
b(e).
Similarly to the representation as multi-weighted graphs, an abstract path of a network
congestion game is either a single configuration or a non-empty, finite or infinite sequence
of consecutive edges in the abstract weighted graph. The cost of an abstract path is the sum
of the weights of its edges (if any). Then:
I Lemma 4. For any w ∈ N ∪ {+∞}, there is an abstract path inM with social cost w if,
and only if, there is an abstract path in P with cost w.
2.2 Social optima and equilibria
Consider a dynamic network congestion game G = 〈A, n〉. We recall standard ways of
optimizing the strategies of the players, depending on the situation.
In a collaborative situation, all players want to collectively minimize the total cost for
having all of them reach the target state of the arena. Formally, a strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈JnK
realizes the social optimum if soccost(σ) = infτ∈Sn soccost(τ).
In a selfish situation, each player aims at optimizing their response to the others’ strategies.
Given a strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈JnK, a player k ∈ JnK, and a strategy σ′k ∈ S, we denote
by 〈σ−k, σ′k〉 the strategy profile (τi)i∈JnK such that τk = σ′k and τi = σi for all i ∈ JnK \ {k}.
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The strategy σk is a best response to (σi)i∈JnK\{k} if costk(σ) = infσ′
k
∈S costk(〈σ−k, σ′k〉).
A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈JnK is a Nash equilibrium if for each k ∈ JnK, the strategy σk is a
best response to (σi)i∈JnK\{k}. In such a case, no player has profitable unilateral deviations,
i.e., no player alone can decrease their cost by switching to a different strategy.
Nash equilibria can be defined for subclasses of strategy profiles. In particular, a blind
Nash equilibrium is a blind strategy profile σ that is a Nash equilibrium for blind-strategy
deviations: for all k ∈ JnK, costk(σ) = infσ′
k
∈B costk(〈σ−k, σ′k〉). A priori, a blind Nash
equilibrium need not be a Nash equilibrium for general strategies.
In an NE, once a player deviated from their original strategy in the strategy profile,
the other players can punish the deviating player, even if this results in increasing their own
costs. Indeed, the condition for being an NE only requires that the deviation should not be
profitable to the deviating player. Subgame-Perfect Equilibria (SPE) refine NEs and rule
out such non-credible threats by requiring that, for any path h in the configuration graph,
the residual strategy profile after h is an NE.
I Example 5. Consider again the dynamic NCG 〈A, 2〉, with the arena A of Fig. 1. Assume
that Player 1 plays the blind strategy corresponding to pi3 : src → v2 → v3 → tgt, while
Player 2 plays the non-blind strategy σ of Example 3. The cost for Player 1 then is 10, while
that of Player 2 is 12.
This strategy profile is an NE: Player 2 could be tempted to play pi1, but they would
then synchronize with Player 1 on edge v3 → tgt, and get cost 12 again. Similarly, Player 1
could be tempted to play pi1 instead of pi3, but in that case strategy σ would tell Player 2 to
follow the same path, and the cost for Player 1 (and 2) would be 16. Notice in particular
that this is not an SPE, but that the blind strategy profile 〈pi1, pi2〉 (extended to the whole
configuration tree in the only possible way) is an SPE in 〈A, 2〉. J
In Sections 4 and 5, we focus on NEs and SPEs, developing EXPSPACE and 2EXPSPACE-
algorithms for deciding the existence of NEs and SPEs respectively of social cost less than or
equal to a given bound. Actually, our approach extends to the ~γ-weighted social cost, where
~γ ∈ ZJnK are coefficients applied to the costs of the respective players when computing the
social cost. As a consequence, we can compute best and worst NEs and SPEs, hence also
the price of anarchy and price of stability [13]. Before that, in Section 3, we extend classical
techniques using blind strategies to compute the social optimum and prove that NEs always
exist.
3 Socially-optimal strategy profiles
To compute a socially-optimal strategy profile, it suffices to find a path in the concurrent
game structure of the given network congestion game with minimal total cost since one can
define a strategy profile that induces any given path. Rather than finding such a path in the
concurrent game structure, and in view of Lemma 4, one can look for one in the abstract
weighted graph, thereby reducing in complexity. The socially-optimal cost in a dynamic
NCG 〈A, n〉 is thus the cost of a shortest path in the associated weighted abstract graph P
from c¯src to c¯tgt.
Since P has exponential size, we derive complexity upper bounds for computing a socially-
optimal strategy and deciding the associated decision problem. Moreover, adapting [15,
Theorem 4.1] which proves NP-hardness in classical NCGs, we provide a reduction from the
Partition problem to establish an NP lower-bound.
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I Theorem 6. A socially-optimal strategy profile can be computed in exponential time.
The constrained social-optimum problem is in PSPACE and NP-hard.
Note, that while P has size (n + 1)|V |, it is sufficient to consider paths with a smaller
number of transitions when looking for a shortest path:
I Lemma 7. There is a shortest path (w.r.t. cost) in P with size (in terms of its number of
transitions) at most n · |V |.
I Remark 8. A consequence of Lemma 7 is that deciding the constrained social-optimum
problem is in NP for asymmetric games, since in that setting the lists of sources and targets
of each player is part of the input, so that n is polynomial in the size of the input. However,
our NP-hardness proof only works in the symmetric case.
4 Nash equilibria
In this section, we study the existence of Nash equilibria and give algorithms to compute
them under given constraints.
4.1 Existence and computation of (blind) Nash equilibria
To prove that blind Nash equilibria always exist, we establish that dynamic NCGs with blind
strategies are potential games [19, 16] which are known to have Nash equilibria.
Consider a dynamic NCG 〈A, n〉, a blind strategy profile pi, and let Npi denote the
maximum length of the paths prescribed by pi. We define the following potential function,
which is an adaptation of that used in [19]:
ψ(pi) =
Npi∑
j=1
∑
e∈E
loade(pi,j)∑
i=1
fe(i),
where loade(pi, j) denotes the number of players that take edge e in the j-step under pi, and
fe is the cost function on edge e.
Using the above-defined potential function, one can derive an algorithm to find a Nash
equilibrium, by a classical best-response iteration. Starting with an arbitrary blind strategy
profile, at each step we replace some player’s strategy with their best-response, and we
continue as long as some player’s cost can be decreased. When this procedure terminates,
the profile at hand is a blind Nash equilibrium. In dynamic NCGs, best responses exist and
can be computed in polynomial time. Indeed, one can construct a game in which all players
but Player i follow their fixed strategies given by profile pi, using Npi copies of the game in
order to distinguish the steps. After the Npi-step, all players in JnK \ {i} have reached their
targets. Since it is the only remaining player, the remaining path for Player i should not be
longer than |V |. Altogether, we obtain the following complexity upper-bound:
I Theorem 9. In dynamic NCGs, blind Nash equilibria always exist, and we can compute
one in pseudo-polynomial time.
I Remark 10. As an alternative proof to existence of blind NEs, we could have bounded
the length of outcomes of blind NEs as follows: all players have a strategy realizing cost at
most |V | · κ, where κ = maxe∈E fe(n), since the shortest path from src to tgt has length at
most |V |, and the cost for a player at each step along edge e is at most κ. It follows that
no path along which the cost for some player is larger than |V | · κ can be the outcome of a
N. Bertrand, N. Markey, S. Sadhukhan, O. Sankur XX:9
blind NE. As a consequence, if a dynamic NCG has a blind NE, then it has one of length at
most |V | · κ · |V |n (by removing zero-cycles). Using this bound, we can transform dynamic
NCGs into classical congestion games, in which blind NEs always exist [10, 19].
We now show that blind Nash equilibria are in fact Nash equilibria. This is proved using
the observation that given a blind strategy profile, the most profitable deviation for any
player can be assumed to be a blind strategy.
I Lemma 11. In dynamic NCGs, blind Nash equilibria are Nash equilibria.
Computing some (blind) Nash equilibrium may not be satisfactory for two reasons: one
might want to compute the best (or the worst) Nash equilibrium in terms of the social cost;
and as Lemma 12 claims, blind Nash equilibria are suboptimal, i.e., a lower social cost can be
achieved by Nash equilibria with general strategies. This justifies the study of more complex
strategy profiles in the next subsection.
I Lemma 12. There exists a dynamic NCG with a Nash equilibrium pi such that for all
blind Nash equilibria pi′, we have cost(pi) < cost(pi′).
The proof (detailed in Appendix B) is based on the dynamic NCG depicted on Fig. 2,
for which we prove there is a Nash equilibrium with total cost 36, while any blind Nash
equilibrium has higher social cost.
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Figure 2 An arena on which blind Nash equilibria are sub-optimal.
4.2 Computation of general Nash equilibria
Characterization of outcomes of Nash Equilibria. Let us consider a dynamic NCG 〈A, n〉,
and the corresponding game structure S = 〈C, T,M,U〉. Given two configurations c, c′
with c⇒ c′, we let costi(c, c′) denote the cost of Player i on this transition from c(i) to c′(i).
We define devi(c, c′) as the set of all configurations reachable when all players but Player i
choose moves prescribed by the given transition c⇒ c′:
devi(c, c′) = {c′′ ∈ C | c⇒ c′′ and ∀j ∈ JnK \ {i}. c′′(j) = c′(j)}.
The value of configuration c for Player i is vali,c = supσ−i∈Sn−1 infσi∈S costi((σ−i, σi), c).
Note that the value corresponds to the value of the zero-sum game where Player i plays
against the opposing coalition, starting at c. By [11], those values can be computed in
polynomial time in the size of the game. Here the game is a 2-player game with state space
|V | × Jn− 1K|V |, keeping track of the position of Player i and the abstract position of the
coalition. It follows that each vali,c can be computed in exponential time in the size of the
input 〈A, n〉. Moreover, memoryless optimal strategies exist (in S), that is, the opposing
coalition has a memoryless strategy σ−i to ensure a cost of at least vali,c from c.
The characterization of Nash equilibria outcomes is given in the following lemma.
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I Lemma 13. A path ρ in 〈A, n〉 is the outcome of a Nash equilibrium if, and only if,
∀i ∈ JnK. ∀1 ≤ l < |ρ|. ∀c ∈ devi(ρ(l), ρ(l + 1)). costi(ρ≥l) ≤ vali,c + costi(ρ(l), c).
The intuition is that if the suffix costi(ρ≥l) of ρ has cost more than vali,c + costi(ρ(l), c),
then Player i has a profitable deviation regardless of the strategy of the opposing coalition,
since vali,c is the maximum cost that the coalition can inflict to Player i at configuration c
where the deviation is observed. The lemma shows that the absence of such a suffix means
that a Nash equilibrium with given outcome exists, which the proof constructs.
Proof. Consider a Nash equilibrium σ = (σi)i∈JnK with outcome ρ. Consider any player i,
and any strategy σ′i for this player. Let ρ′ denote the outcome of σ[i→ σ′i]. Let l denote the
index of the last configuration where ρ and ρ′ are identical. Since σ is a Nash equilibrium,
we have costi(ρ) ≤ costi(ρ′), that is,
costi(ρ≥l) ≤ costi(ρ(l), ρ′(l + 1)) + costi(σ[i→ σ′i], ρ′≤l+1)
where costi(σ[i→ σ′i], ρ′≤l+1) is the cost for Player i of the outcome of the residual strategy
(σ[i→ σ′i])ρ
′
≤l+1 . Since the choice of σ′i is arbitrary here, we have,
costi(ρ≥l) ≤ costi(ρ(l), ρ′(l + 1)) + inf
σ′
i
∈S
costi(σ[i→ σ′i], ρ′≤l+1).
Moreover, we have infσ′
i
∈S costi(pi[i→ σ′i], ρ′≤l+1) = infσ′i∈S costi(pi[i→ σ′i], ρ′(l + 1)) since
memoryless strategies suffice to minimize the cost [11]. We then have
inf
σ′
i
∈S
costi(pi[i→ σ′i], ρ′(l + 1)) ≤ sup
σ−i∈Sn−1
inf
σi∈S
costi((σ−i, σi), ρ′(l + 1)).
We obtain the required inequality
costi(ρ≥l) ≤ costi(ρ(l), ρ′(l + 1)) + sup
σ−i∈Sn−1
inf
σi∈S
costi((σ−i, σi), ρ′(l + 1))
≤ costi(ρ(l), c) + vali,c.
Conversely, consider a path ρ that satisfies the condition. We are going to construct
a Nash equilibrium having outcome ρ. The idea is that players will follow ρ, and if some
player i deviates, then the coalition −i will apply a joint strategy to maximize the cost of
Player i, thus achieving at least vali,c, where c is the first configuration where deviation is
detected.
Let us define the punishment function Pρ : Paths(〈A, n〉)→ JnK∪{⊥} which keeps track of
the deviating players and the step where such a player has deviated. For path h′ = h(c, w, c′),
we write
Pρ(h′) =

⊥ if h′ ≤pref ρ,
i if h ≤pref ρ, h(c, w, c′) 6≤pref ρ, and i ∈ JnK min. s.t. c′(i) 6= ρ(|h|+ 1)(i),
Pρ(h) otherwise.
Intuitively, ⊥ means that no players have deviated from ρ in the current path. If Ppi(h) = j,
then Player j was among the first players to deviate from ρ in the path h; so for some l,
h(l)(j) = ρ(l)(j) but h(l + 1)(j) 6= ρ(l + 1)(j). Notice that if several players deviate at the
same step, there are no conditions to be checked, and the strategy can be chosen arbitrarily.
For each configuration c and coalition −i, let σ−i,c be the strategy of coalition −i maximizing
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the cost of Player i from configuration c; thus achieving at least vali,c. Player j’s strategy in
this coalition, for j 6= i, is denoted σ−i,c,j . For path h′ = h(c, w, c′), define
τi(h′) =

(c′(i),m(i), c′′(i)) if Pρ(h′) = ⊥, ρ(|h′|+ 1) = (c′, w′, c′′),
and m ∈ En is such that T (c′,m) = (w′, c′′),
arbitrary if Pρ(h′) = i,
σ−j,c,i(h′) if Pρ(h′) = j for some j 6= i.
The first case ensures that the outcome of the profile (τi)i∈JnK is ρ. The third case means that
Player i follows the coalition strategy σ−j,c after Player j has deviated to configuration c.
The second case corresponds to the case where Player i has deviated: the precise definition
of this part of the strategy is irrelevant.
Let us show that this profile is indeed a Nash equilibrium. Consider any player j ∈ JnK
and any strategy τ ′j . Let ρ′ denote the outcome of (τ−j , τ ′j), and l the index of the last
configuration where ρ and ρ′ are identical. We have
costj((τ−j , τ ′j)) = costj(ρ≤l) + costj(ρ(l), ρ′(l + 1)) + costj((τ−j , τj), ρ′≤l+1)
≥ costj(ρ≤l) + costj(ρ(l), ρ′(l + 1)) + valj,ρ′(l+1)(j)
≥ costj((τi)i∈JnK),
where the second line follows from the fact that the coalition switches to a strategies ensuring
a cost of at least valj,ρ′(l)(j) at step l; and the third line is obtained by assumption. This
shows that (τi)i∈JnK is indeed a Nash equilibrium and concludes the proof. J
Algorithm. We define a graph that describes the set of outcomes of Nash equilibria by
augmenting the n-weighted configuration graphM = 〈C, T 〉. For any real vector ~γ = (γi)i∈JnK,
we define the weighted graph G〈A,n〉,~γ = 〈C ′, T ′〉 with C ′ = C × (JY K ∪ {0,∞})n where
Y = |V | · κ, and T ′ ⊆ C ′ ×N× C ′; remember that all players have a strategy realizing cost
at most Y in 〈A, n〉. The initial state is (csrc,∞n). The set of transitions T ′ is defined as
follows: ((c, b), z, (c′, b′)) ∈ T ′ if, and only if, there exists (c, w, c′) ∈ T , z = ~γ · w (where · is
dot product), and for all i ∈ JnK,
b′i = min(bi − wi, min
c′′∈devi(c(i),c′(i))
costi(c, c′′) + vali,c′′ − wi). (1)
Notice that by definition of C ′, b′i must be nonnegative for all i ∈ JnK, so there are no
transitions ((c, b), z, (c′, b′)) if the above expression is negative for some i. Notice also that
the size of G〈A,n〉,~γ is doubly-exponential in that of the input 〈A, n〉, since this is already the
case for C, while Y is singly-exponential.
Intuitively, for any path ρ that visits some state (c, b) in this graph, in order for ρ to be
compatible with a Nash equilibrium, each player i must have cost no more than bi in the rest
of the path. In fact, the second term of the minimum in (1) is the least cost Player i could
guarantee by not following (c, w, c′) but going to some other configuration c′′ ∈ devi(c, c′), so
the bound bi is used to guarantee that these deviations are not profitable. The definition
of b′i in (1) is the minimum of bi − wi and the aforementioned quantity since we check both
the previous bound bi, updated with the current cost wi (which gives the left term), and
the non-profitability of a deviation at the previous state (which is the right term). If this
minimum becomes negative, this precisely means that at an earlier point in the current path,
there was a strategy for Player i which was more profitable than the current path regardless
of the strategies of other players; so the current path cannot be the outcome of a Nash
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equilibrium. This is why the definition of G〈A,n〉,~γ restricts the state space to nonnegative
values for the bi.
We prove that computing the cost of a Nash equilibrium minimizing the ~γ-weighted social
cost reduces to computing a shortest path in G〈A,n〉,~γ . In particular, letting γi = 1 for all
i ∈ JnK, a ~γ-minimal Nash equilibrium is a best Nash equilibrium (minimizing the social
cost), while taking γi = −1 for all i ∈ JnK, we get a worst Nash equilibrium (maximizing the
social cost).
I Theorem 14. For any dynamic NCG 〈A, n〉 and vector ~γ, the cost of the shortest path
from (csrc,∞n) to some (ctgt, b) in G〈A,n〉,~γ is the cost of a ~γ-minimal Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We show that for each path of 〈A, n〉 from csrc to ctgt, there is a path in G〈A,n〉,~γ from
(csrc,∞n) to some (ctgt, b) with the same cost, and vice versa.
Consider a Nash equilibrium pi = (σj)j∈JnK with outcome ρ = (cj , wj , cj+1)1≤j<l. We build
a sequence b1, b2, . . . such that ρ′ = ((cj , bj), ~γ · wj , (cj+1, bj+1))1≤j<l is a path of G〈A,n〉,~γ .
We set b1(j) =∞ for all j ∈ JnK. For j ≥ 1, define
bj+1(i) = min
(
bj(i)− wj(i), min
c′′∈devj(cj(i),cj+1(i))
costi(cj , c′′) + vali,c′′ − wj(i)
)
.
We are going to show that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l, costi(ρ≥j) ≤ bj , which shows that bj ≥ 0, and
thus ρ′ is a path of G〈A,n〉,~γ .
We show this by induction on j. This is clear for j = 1. Assume this holds up to j ≥ 1.
We have, by induction that costi(ρ≥j) ≤ bj(i) for all i ∈ JnK. Moreover, since pi is a Nash
equilibrium, by Lemma 13,
∀i ∈ JnK, costi(ρ≥j) ≤ min
c′′∈devi(ρ(j),ρ(j+1))
vali,c′′ + costi(ρ(j), c′′).
Therefore,
costi(ρ≥j+1) = costi(ρ≥j)− wj(i)
≤ min(bj(i)− wj(i), min
c′′∈devi(ρ(j),ρ(j+1))
vali,c′′ + costi(ρ(j), c′′)− wj(i))
as required, and both paths have the same ~γ-weighted cost.
Consider now a path ((ci, bi), zi, (ci+1, bi+1))1≤i<l in G〈A,n〉,~γ . By the definition of G〈A,n〉,~γ ,
there exists w1, w2, . . . such that ρ = (cj , wj , cj+1)1≤j<l is a path of 〈A, n〉, and zj = ~γ · wj .
So it only remains to show that that ρ is the outcome of a Nash equilibrium. We will show
that ρ satisfies the criterion of Lemma 13. We show by backwards induction on 1 ≤ j ≤ l
that for all i ∈ JnK,
1. costi(ρ≥j) ≤ bj(i),
2. costi(ρ≥j) ≤ minc′′∈devi(ρ(j),c′′) costi(ρ(j), c′′) + vali,c′′ .
For j = l, we have costi(ρ≥l) = 0 so this is trivial. Assume the property holds down to j + 1
for some 1 ≤ j < l. By induction hypothesis, we have
costi(ρ≥j+1) ≤ bj+1(i) = min
(
bj(i)− wj(i), min
c′′∈devi(ρ(j),c′′)
costi(ρ(j), c′′) + vali,c′′ − wj(i)
)
.
Therefore,
costi(ρ≥j) = costi(ρ≥j+1) + wj(i) ≤ min
(
bj(i), min
c′′∈devi(ρ(j),c′′)
costi(ρ(j), c′′) + vali,c′′
)
,
as required. By Lemma 13, ρ is the outcome of a Nash equilibrium. J
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Thanks to Theorem 14, we can compute the costs of the best and worst NEs of 〈A, n〉 in
exponential space. We can also decide the existence of an NE with constraints on the costs
(both social and individual), by non-deterministically guessing an outcome and checking
in G〈A,n〉,~γ that it is indeed an NE. We obtain the following conclusion:
I Corollary 15. In dynamic NCGs, the constrained Nash-equilibrium problem is in EX-
PSPACE.
Proof. As noted earlier, the number of vertices in G〈A,n〉,~γ is doubly exponential since
|C| = |V |n is doubly exponential. Storing a configuration and computing its successors can
be performed in exponential space. One can thus guess a path of size at most the size of
the graph and check whether its cost is less than the given bound. This can be done using
exponential-space counters, and provides us with an EXPSPACE algorithm. J
Note that one can effectively compute a Nash-equilibrium strategy profile satisfying the
constraints in doubly-exponential time by finding the shortest path of G〈A,n〉,~γ , and applying
the construction of (the proof of) Lemma 13.
I Remark 16. The exponential complexity is due to the encoding of the number of players in
binary. If we consider asymmetric NCGs, in which the source-target pairs would be given
explicitly for all players, the size of G〈A,n〉,~γ would be singly-exponential, and the constrained
Nash-equilibrium problem would be in PSPACE.
5 Subgame-perfect equilibria
In this section, we characterize the outcomes of SPEs and decide the existence of SPEs with
constraints on the social cost. We follow the approach of [8], extending it to the setting of
concurrent weighted games, which we need to handle dynamic NCGs.
Characterization of outcomes of SPE. Consider a dynamic NCG 〈A, n〉, and the associated
configuration graphM = 〈C, T 〉. We partition the set C of configurations into (Xj)0≤j≤n
such that a configuration c is in Xj if, and only if, j = #{i ∈ JnK | c(i) = tgt}. Since tgt is a
sink state in A, if there is a transition from some configuration in Xj to some configuration
in Xk, then k ≥ j. We define X≥j =
⋃
i≥j Xi, Zj = {(c, w, c′) ∈ T | c ∈ Xj} and
Z≥j = {(c, w, c′) ∈ T | c ∈ X≥j}.
Following [8], we inductively define a sequence (λj∗)0≤j≤n, where each λj
∗ = 〈λj∗i 〉i∈JnK
is a n-tuple of labeling functions λj
∗
i : Z≥j → N ∪ {−∞,+∞}. This sequence will be used to
characterize outcomes of SPEs through the notion of λ-consistency:
I Definition 17. Let j ≤ n, and λ = (λi)i∈JnK be a family of functions such that λ : Z≥j →
N ∪ {−∞,+∞} Let c ∈ X≥j. A finite path ρ = (tk)1≤k<|ρ| from c ending in ctgt is said to
be λ-consistent whenever for any i ∈ JnK and any 1 ≤ k < |ρ|, it holds costi(ρ≥k) ≤ λi(tk).
We write Γλ(c) for the set of all λ-consistent paths from c.
We now define λj∗ for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n in such a way that, for all c ∈ X≥j , Γλj∗ (c) is
the set of all outcomes of SPEs in the subgame rooted at c. The case where j = n is
simple: we have X≥n = {ctgt} and Z≥n = {(ctgt, 0n, ctgt)}; there is a single path, which
obviously is the outcome of an SPE since no deviations are possible. For all i ∈ JnK, we let
λn
∗
i (ctgt, 0n, ctgt) = 0.
Now, fix j < n, assuming that λ(j+1)∗ has been defined. In order to define λj∗ , we in-
troduce an intermediary sequence (µki )k≥0,i∈JnK, with µki : Z≥j → N ∪ {−∞,+∞}, of which
(λj
∗
i )i∈JnK will be the limit.
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Functions µki mainly operate on Zj = Z≥j \ Z≥j+1: for any e ∈ Z≥j+1, we let µki (e) =
λ
(j+1)∗
i (e). Now, for e = (c, w, c′) ∈ Zj , µki (e) is defined inductively as follows:
µ0i (e) = 0 if c(i) = tgt, and µ0i (e) = +∞ otherwise;
for k > 0, µk is defined from µk−1 following three cases: if c(i) = tgt, then µki (e) = 0; if
Γµk−1(c′) = ∅ for some (c, w′, c′) ∈ T , then µki (e) = −∞; otherwise,
µki (e) = min
c′′∈devi(c,c′)
sup
ρ∈Γ
µl−1 (c′′)
(costi(c, c′′) + costi(ρ))
We can then prove that for any e ∈ Z≥j and any k > 0, µki (e) ≥ µk−1i (e). It follows that
the sequence (µk)k≥0 stabilizes, and we can define λj
∗ as its limit. Let Γ∗ = Γλ0∗ . Then:
I Theorem 18. A path ρ in G = 〈A, n〉 is the outcome of an SPE if, and only if, ρ ∈ Γ∗(csrc).
Algorithm. It remains to compute the sequence (µk)k≥0 (which will include checking non-
emptiness of the corresponding Γ-sets), and to bound the stabilization time. To this aim,
with any family µ = (µi)i∈JnK of functions as above and any configuration c, we associate an
infinite-state counter graph C[µ, c] = 〈C ′, T ′〉 to capture all µ-consistent paths from c:
the set of vertices is C ′ = C × (N ∪ {+∞})JnK;
T ′ contains all edges ((d, b), w, (d′, b′)) for which (d,w, d′) is an edge of M and for
all i ∈ JnK, b′(i) = 0 if d(i) = tgt, and b′i = min{bi − wi, µi(d,w, d′) − wi} otherwise
(provided that b′i ≥ 0 for all i, in order for (d′, b′) to be an edge of C[µ, c]).
With the initial configuration c, we associate bc such that bci = 0 if c(i) = tgt and bci = +∞
otherwise: this configuration imposes no constraint, since no edges has been taken yet.
Intuitively, in configuration (d, b), b is used to enforce µ-consistency: each edge taken along
a path imposes a constraint on the cost of the players for the rest of the path; this constraint
is added to the constraints of the earlier edges, and propagated along the path. We can
prove that the number of reachable states from (c, bc) in C[µ, c], which we denote with |C ′|r,
is bounded by |C| · (n · |V |n · κ)|V |.
Computing λj∗ from λ(j+1)∗ amounts to inductively computing (µk+1i )i∈JnK from µk for
edges e = (c, w, c′) ∈ Zj , until stabilization. Since C[µk, d] can be proved to capture µk-
consistent paths from d, the computation mainly amounts to checking the existence of paths
in such counter graphs, which can be performed in doubly-exponential space. Stabilization
can be shown to occur within |V |(1 + n · κ · |E|n) steps. In the end:
I Theorem 19. The existence of SPEs in a dynamic NCG can be decided in 2EXPSPACE.
I Remark 20. Again, our algorithm is not specific to the symmetric setting of our dynamic
NCGs; in an asymmetric context, where the number of players would be given in unary, our
algorithm would run in EXPSPACE.
Existence of constrained SPEs. The algorithm above can be extended to compute the
cost of the best and worst SPEs, and to include constraints on the costs (both social and
individual) of the SPEs we are looking for.
First, for any vector ~γ = (γi)i∈JnK, we define the ~γ-counter graph C[λ∗, csrc, ~γ], which is
obtained from C[λ∗, csrc] by replacing the cost vector w on the edges with ~γ · w.
We can then compute the cost of a ~γ-minimal SPE by checking existence of a path
from (csrc, bcsrc) to (ctgt, b) in C[λ∗, csrc, ~γ], which minimizes the ~γ-weighted social cost. Again,
letting γi = 1 for all i ∈ JnK, a ~γ-minimal SPE is a best SPE, while taking γi = −1 for all
i ∈ JnK, we get a worst SPE (maximizing social cost).
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We can also solve the constrained-SPE-existence problem by non-deterministically guessing
an outcome and checking that it is a path in C[λ0∗ , csrc] and that it satisfies the constraints.
In each case, we can inductively build a strategy profile witnessing the fact that the selected
path is the outcome of an SPE.
6 Conclusion and future works
In this paper, we introduced dynamic network congestion games, and studied the complexity
of various decision and computation problems concerning social optima, Nash equilibria and
subgame perfect equilibria. Our algorithms allow us to compute the price of anarchy and
price of stability for those games.
As future work, our objective is to compute how the price of anarchy and the price of
stability (and costs of equilibria and social optimum) evolve when the number of players,
seen as a parameter, grows.
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A Proofs of Section 3
I Theorem 6. A socially-optimal strategy profile can be computed in exponential time.
The constrained social-optimum problem is in PSPACE and NP-hard.
Proof. A socially-optimal strategy can be obtained by computing a shortest path in P
from c¯src to c¯tgt. The graph P has O(n|V |) states, and shortest paths can be computed in
polynomial time. We can thus compute the (abstract) outcome of a socially-optimal strategy
profile in exponential time. We easily derive a socially-optimal (blind) strategy profile.
An abstract configuration can be stored in space O(|V | · log(n)), and deciding whether
there is an edge of a given weight between two abstract configurations can be checked
in PSPACE. Since shortest paths in P have length at most n · |V |, a non-deterministic
polynomial-space algorithm can guess a path step-by-step in P, and check that it reaches
the target configuration with social-cost at most b.
By Savitch’s theorem, this proves PSPACE membership.
To prove the NP-hardness we provide a reduction from the Partition problem which, given
a family of integer numbers (ri)1≤i≤m that sum up to 2S, asks whether the family can be
split into two subfamilies that both sum up to S. Consider an instance L of Partition, and
let M = 14S + 12m+ 1, and n = 2S + 2m. For any r ∈ N, we define threshold cost function
Tr as Tr(i) = 1 if i ≤ r, and Tr(i) = M otherwise We construct a dynamic NCG AL with
states V = {src, tgt, d1, d2} ∪ {si, ai,1, ai,2}i∈JmK. The transitions are defined as follows:
for each i ∈ JmK, there is a transition from src to si which cost function Tri+2;
from each si, there is a transition to ai,1 and another one to ai,2 with the same cost
function that assigns cost 2 for one player, and 4 for more;
for i ∈ JmK and j ∈ {1, 2}, there is a transition from ai,j to dj with constant cost 1, and
a transition to tgt with cost function T1;
from each dj , there is a transition to tgt with cost function TS .
The construction is illustrated in Figure 3.
src si
. . .
. . .
ai,1
ai,2
d1
d2
tgt
1 if x≤ri+2
M if x>ri+2
2 if x≤1
4 if x>1
2 if x≤1
4 if x>1
1
1
1 if x≤S
M if x>S
1 if x≤S
M if x>S
1 if x=1
M if x>1
1 if x=1
M if x>1
Figure 3 The reduction of Theorem 6. The figure shows the edges involving states si, ai,1, ai,2.
The full graph is obtained by reproducing the shown construction for all i ∈ JmK.
We prove that there exists a strategy profile in 〈A, n〉 with social cost less than M if, and
only if, L is a positive instance of the partition problem. Assume that the instance L has a
solution 〈L1, L2〉. We describe the behaviour of the strategy profile in AL achieving social
cost less than M .
Initially, all players are at src. During the first step, for each i ∈ JmK, (ri + 2) players
move to si. This incurs a total cost of
∑
i∈JmK ri + 2 = ∑i∈JmK ri + 2×m = 2S + 2m;
Consider i ∈ JmK, and let j ∈ {1, 2} be such that ri ∈ Lj . From state si we let ri + 1
players move to ai,j , and one player to ai,3−j . The ri + 1 players each pay a cost of 4,
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and other player a cost of 2. Overall, we get a total cost of
∑
i∈JmK((ri + 1)× 4 + 1× 2) =
8S + 4m+ 2m = 8S + 6m;
From each ai,j , one player takes the transition directly to tgt. All other players move
to dj . Overall, 2m players directly move to tgt, while all other players, that are 2S many
of them, move to {d1, d2}. The total cost of this step is therefore 2S+ 2m× 2 = 2S+ 4m;
From each dj , players necessarily move directly to tgt. For each i ∈ JmK and j ∈ {1, 2},
exactly ri players arrive to dj from ai,j . Thus there are exactly S players in each dj ,
so that the total cost of this step is 2S.
Summing over all steps, the social cost of this strategy profile is 14S + 12m < M .
Now for the opposite direction, consider any strategy profile pi in 〈A, n〉 with social cost
less than M . We are going to construct a partition of L. First we divide the path taken
by players from src to tgt in three phases: Phase 1: from src to some si; Phase 2: from
some si to some ai,j ; Phase 3: from ai,j to tgt, either directly or via dj . We now analyze
the cost incurred by players under profile pi in all three phases.
In phase 1, each player pays either cost 1 or cost M . By assumption on pi, all players
must have a cost of 1, and this is only possible if ri + 2 players move to si, for each i ∈ JmK.
The total cost of this phase is thus 2S + 2m.
In phase 3, a player pays a cost of either 2, M or M + 1. For the latter two cases are not
possible by assumption. So phase 3’s contribution to the social cost has to be 2×n = 4S+4m.
Then, the social cost of phase 2 is strictly less than (14S+12m+1)−(2S+2m)−(4S+4m) =
8S + 6m+ 1. By phase 1, there are ri + 2 players at each si, so minimum contribution to the
social cost for these ri + 2 players is 2× 1 + 4× (ri + 2) = 4ri + 6. Summing overall i ∈ JmK,
this yields
∑
ri∈L(4ri + 6) = 8S + 6m. Thus, the social cost of phase 2 is 8S + 6m. But this
cost is achieved only when from each si, one transition is taken by one player and the other
one by ri + 1 players.
Therefore, each ai,j contains either one player or (ri + 1) players under pi. Given the cost
functions, at most 2S players can move to tgt via d1 or d2 (otherwise players would get a
cost of M). So 2m remaining players must take the transition from some ai,j to tgt. But at
each ai,j , there is a unique player that takes this transition due to the cost function. If ai,j
contains ri + 1 players, ri players take the path via dj , each paying a cost of 2. As there are
in total 2S players taking the route via some dj , and each dj can contain at most S players
because of the cost functions, there must be exactly S many players which arrive at each dj
under P. That is, for each i, j, there are exactly ri many players coming from some ai,j
to dj , and their total is S. This defines the required partition of L. J
I Lemma 7. There is a shortest path (w.r.t. cost) in P with size (in terms of its number of
transitions) at most n · |V |.
Proof. We begin with proving that, for any path ρ in the multi-weighted graphM in which
no player reaches the target state during the first n steps, there is a path ρ′ with social
cost at most the social cost of ρ in which at least one player reaches the target state. This
obviously extends to P.
To this aim, we consider, for each state s of A, the shortest path from s to tgt for a single
player (i.e., when taking for each edge the value of the cost function when a single player
takes that edge). Clearly enough, this is the best a player can hope from state s. Now, we
label all state s with the number opt(s) of edges of the shortest (in terms of the number of
edges) of the shortest (in terms of its single-player cost) paths. Then those values are at
most |V | − 1, and opt(s) = 0 if, and only if, s = tgt.
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Now, consider a path ρ inM, in which we assume no player reaches tgt during the first
|V | steps. We build a table H of size n× |V |, in which cell (i, j) contains j + opt(ρ(j)(i)).
Then for any i, H(i, 1) is at most |V |, and H(i, |V |) is at least |V | + 1, since we assume
no players have reached tgt after |V | steps. Hence there is an index 1 ≤ j0 < |V | that
contains an element smaller than or equal to |V |, and being the largest so. Pick i0 such
that H(i0, j0) ≤ |V |, and consider the path ρ′ inM obtained from ρ by making Player i0
follow an optimal path from ρ(j0)(i0). Along this new path ρ′, Player i0 will reach tgt in
H(i0, j0) steps, which is less than or equal to |V |. Moreover, after step j0, Player i0 can be
sure no other player takes the same edges, since this would mean that for some player i1,
at some step j1 > j0, we have H(i1, j1) ≤ |V |. Hence the cost for Player i0 is at least as
good along ρ′ as it was along ρ; also, the cost of all other players may only have decreased.
It follows that the social cost of ρ′ is at least as good as that of ρ.
Now, consider a shortest path in P, and a corresponding path ρ in M. Applying the
arguments above, we can build a path ρ′ in M with social cost at least as good as that
of ρ, and in which at least one player reaches tgt. We can then apply the same arguments
recursively to the other players, each in a slide of at most |V | steps. In the end, we get a
path with minimal social cost and of length at most n× |V |. J
B Proofs of Section 4
I Lemma B.1. In every dynamic NCG, there exists a blind Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider a dynamic NCG 〈A, n〉 with A = 〈V,E, src, tgt〉, and a blind strategy
profile pi = (σi)i∈JnK. Recall that each blind strategy σi prescribes a path independently of
the other players moves. Let us show that ψ is indeed a potential function, that is, for each
profile pi′ obtained from pi by modifying some player k’s strategy, we have
ψ(pi)− ψ(pi′) = costk(pi)− costk(pi′).
Consider such a profile pi′ obtained by replacing player k’s strategy from σk to some
other blind strategy σ′k. Let us denote by e1e2 . . . the path of σk, and by e′1e′2 . . . that of σ′k.
Let E′ denote the set of edges of both paths.
ψ(pi)− ψ(pi′) =
Npi∑
j=1
∑
e∈E
loade(pi,j)∑
i=1
coste(i)−
Npi′∑
j=1
∑
e∈E
loade(pi′,j)∑
i=1
coste(i),
=
∑
e∈E′
Npi∑
j=1
loade(pi,j)∑
i=1
coste(i)−
∑
e∈E′
Npi′∑
j=1
loade(pi′,j)∑
i=1
coste(i),
=
Npi∑
j=1
costej (loadej(pi,j))−
Npi′∑
j=1
coste′
j
(loadej(pi′,j))
= costk(pi)− costk(pi′).
Here, the second line is the definition; the third line follows from the fact that both terms
are equal for edges e 6∈ E′ since there is no change on the load. The fourth line is due to the
following observation. Assume that ej 6= e′j . In this case, the load of ej is decreased by 1
in pi, and that of e′j is increased by 1 in pi′. We have
loade(pi,j)∑
i=1
coste(i)−
loade(pi′,j)∑
i=1
coste(i) = coste(loade(pi, j))− coste(loade(pi′, j));
hence the result. J
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I Lemma 11. In dynamic NCGs, blind Nash equilibria are Nash equilibria.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary blind strategy profile pi = (σi)i∈JnK. Assume that Player i
has a profitable deviation, that is, there exists some (non-blind) strategy σ′i such that
costi(pi[i→ σ′i]) < costi(pi). Define the blind strategy σ′′i as the strategy that follows Player-
i’s path in the outcome of pi[i→ σ′i]. Then pi[i→ σ′i] and pi[i→ σ′′i ] have the same outcomes,
hence costi(pi[i→ σ′′i ]) < costi(pi).
In other terms, if there is a profitable deviation strategy for player i, then the new
strategy can be chosen to be blind. This shows that a blind Nash equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium. J
I Lemma B.2. Given a dynamic NCG 〈A, n〉, a blind strategy profile pi, and i ∈ JnK, Player i
has a blind strategy that is their best response to pi. This strategy has size at most Npi + |V |
and can be computed in time O(|V |2 ·N2pi).
Proof. We let A = 〈V,E, src, tgt〉. We define a weighted graph G obtained by concatenating
Npi + 1 copies of A, in which the moves of all other players (but Player i) are hard-coded.
Formally, G = 〈V × JNpi + 1K, E′〉 where
for each edge (v, f, v′) in E, there is an edge ((v,Npi + 1), f(1), (v′, Npi + 1)) in E′: this
encodes the fact that, after Npi + 1 steps, all other players have reached the target state,
and Player i plays alone;
for each edge e = (v, f, v′) in E and each index 1 ≤ k ≤ Npi, there is an edge
((v, k), w, (v′, k + 1)) in E′ with w = f(loade(pi−i, k) + 1), where loade(pi−i, k) is the
number of players (except Player i) taking edge e at step k when following pi−i. This way,
w corresponds to the cost incurred to Player i if they were to take edge e at step k.
By construction, any blind strategy σ′i for Player i in 〈A, n〉 corresponds to a path ρ′
from (src, 1) to (tgt, Npi + 1) in G such that the cost of ρ′ is equal to costi(σ−i, σ′i): Player i
can follow the exact same path as they would in S by ignoring the second component in the
state space of G. Conversely, any path in G from (src, 1) to (tgt, Npi + 1) corresponds to a
path from src to tgt in A, thus to some blind strategy σ′i. The cost of the path is equal to
costi(σ−i, σ′i) by construction.
This shows that the best-response strategy can be computed by a shortest path computa-
tion in G. This path has size at most Npi + |V |: after Npi steps, the path enters configurations
of the form (c,Npi + 1), so all other players have already reached the target; since the shortest
path is acyclic, the bound follows.
This computation can be done with Dijkstra’s algorithm, which runs in O((|V | ·Npi)2). J
I Theorem 9. In dynamic NCGs, blind Nash equilibria always exist, and we can compute
one in pseudo-polynomial time.
Proof. We apply the previous lemma as follows. Consider an initial strategy profile pi0
assigning to each player any acyclic path (thus, of length at most |V |) from src to tgt.
We have ψ(pi0) ≤ |V | ·
∑
e∈E
∑n
i=1 coste(i) ≤ |V |nmaxe∈E coste(n). This quantity is pseudo-
polynomial in the size of 〈A, n〉.
Let pi1, pi2, . . . denote the strategy profiles generated by this iterative procedure. Letmi = Npii .
N. Bertrand, N. Markey, S. Sadhukhan, O. Sankur XX:21
By Lemma B.2, we have mi ≤ m1 + (i− 1)|V |. We then have
k∑
i=1
|V |2m2i ≤ |V |2
k∑
i=1
(m1 + i|V |)2
≤ |V |2
k∑
i=1
(n|V |+ i|V |)2
≤ |V |4 · k · (n+ k)2
where the second step follows from m1 ≤ n|V |. Applying Lemma B.2 again, the running
time of the iterative procedure until the k-th step is O(|V |4 · k · (n+ k)2). In the worst case,
we stop after k = ψ(pi0) steps, so that the algorithm runs in pseudo-polynomial time. J
I Lemma 12. There exists a dynamic NCG with a Nash equilibrium pi such that for all
blind Nash equilibria pi′, we have cost(pi) < cost(pi′).
Proof of Lemma 12. We consider the arena A shown in Fig. 4 with n = 3 players, with
src = q0, tgt = q7.
q0
q1 q2 q3
q4 q5 q6
q7
x 7→
2x
e1
x 7→ 3xe5
x 7→ 3
e2
x 7→ 3
e3 x 7→ 2xe4
x 7→ x
e6
x 7→ 2x
e7
x 7→
2x
e8
x 7→
xpun
1
x 7→
3pun
2
Figure 4 An arena on which blind Nash equilibria are sub-optimal.
The strategy profile pi = (σi)i∈J3K is defined as follows.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, strategy σi chooses e1e2e3e4 with the following exception: if Player 3− i
picks e5 at q0, then take pun1 at q1; if Player 3 − i picks pun1 at q1, then take pun2 at q2.
Strategy σ3 follows e5e6e7e8.
We have costi(pi) = 14 for i ∈ {1, 2}, and cost3(pi) = 8, so cost(pi) = 36.
We first show that pi is a Nash equilibrium.
First, Player 3 has no incentive to deviate since taking e1 at q0 would alone cost 6, and
the rest of the path, either through e2 or pun1e7, has a cost more than 3 so that the total cost
is more than cost3(pi). For Players 1 and 2, there are three states where they can deviate. If
Player i ∈ {1, 2} chooses e5 at q0, then the cost is 6 + 2 + 6 + 6 = 20 as Player 3− i chooses
pun1. Similarly, if they choose pun1 at q1 then Player 3− i chooses pun2 at q2 which yields
a cost of 4 + 1 + 4 + 6 = 15 > costi(pi). Last, if Player i chooses pun2 at q2, their cost is
4 + 3 + 3 + 4 = 14 = costi(pi).
We now show that the profile pi has a lower cost than any blind Nash equilibrium.
There are only four possible blind strategies in our game following one of the four paths
ρ1 = e1e2e3e4, ρ2 = e5e6e7e8, ρ3 = e1pun1e7e8 and ρ4 = e1e2pun2e8. We will represent these
profiles as tuples of paths, e.g. (ρ1, ρ1, ρ2). We are going to consider all possible tuples and
show that each tuple is either not a Nash equilibrium or has cost more than cost(pi) = 36.
Observe that when we permute the players in a Nash equilibrium, it remains a Nash
equilibrium with the same social cost. So we only need to consider the case where all players
use the same strategy (4 possibilities), the case where they all choose distinct strategies (
(4
3
)
),
and the case where two of them choose the same strategy and the other one a different one
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(
(4
1
)× (31)). So there are 20 profiles to check, and the rest of the profiles are permutations of
these.
The following is an exhaustive list of the costs of these profiles.
cost(ρ1, ρ1, ρ1) = 18× 3 = 54
cost(ρ2, ρ2, ρ2) = 24× 3 = 72
cost(ρ3, ρ3, ρ3) = 21× 3 = 63
cost(ρ4, ρ4, ρ4) = 18× 3 = 54
cost(ρ1, ρ2, ρ3) = 12 + 13 + 12 = 37
cost(ρ1, ρ3, ρ4) = 12 + 14 + 15 = 41
cost(ρ1, ρ2, ρ4) = 12 + 12 + 13 = 37
cost(ρ2, ρ3, ρ4) = 14 + 15 + 16 = 45
cost(ρ1, ρ1, ρ2) = 14× 2 + 8 = 36
cost(ρ1, ρ1, ρ3) = 16× 2 + 11 = 43
cost(ρ1, ρ1, ρ4) = 14× 2 + 14 = 42
cost(ρ2, ρ2, ρ1) = 16× 2 + 10 = 42
cost(ρ2, ρ2, ρ3) = 20× 2 + 15 = 55
cost(ρ2, ρ2, ρ4) = 18× 2 + 14 = 50
cost(ρ3, ρ3, ρ1) = 16× 2 + 14 = 46
cost(ρ3, ρ3, ρ2) = 18× 2 + 16 = 52
cost(ρ3, ρ3, ρ4) = 18× 2 + 15 = 51
cost(ρ4, ρ4, ρ1) = 16× 2 + 14 = 46
cost(ρ4, ρ4, ρ2) = 16× 2 + 12 = 44
cost(ρ4, ρ4, ρ3) = 18× 2 + 15 = 51
All profiles have cost at least 36, and the only one that matches 36 is (ρ1, ρ1, ρ2). However,
this is not a Nash equilibrium. In fact, the cost of Player 1 here is 14, but they could profit
from deviating to ρ3 since cost1(ρ3, ρ1, ρ2) = 13. J
C Proofs of Section 5
Equivalence between SPE and very-weak SPE [9]. A strategy σ′i is said to be first-shot
deviating from another strategy σi if they coincide on all histories except the empty history.
A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈JnK is called a very-weak Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ JnK, for
every first-shot deviating strategy σ′i, it holds costi(〈σ−i, σ′i〉) ≥ costi(σ). Notice that this
need not be an NE [9]. Finally, a strategy profile is a very-weak subgame-perfect equilibrium
if it is a very-weak NE from every finite history of the game.
We have the following equivalence:
I Theorem C.3. In a dynamic NCG, a strategy profile is an SPE if, and only if, it is a
very-weak SPE.
We introduce the following notations to ease the writing of the following proofs: Given a
strategy profile σ and a history h, we write outcome(σ, h) for the outcome of the residual strat-
egy σh from the last configuration of h. Similarly, we let costk(σ, h) = costk(outcome(σ, h)).
Proof. It is easily checked that NEs are very-weak NEs, so that SPEs are very-weak SPEs.
For the opposite direction of the equivalence, let us consider a very-weak SPE σ = (σ)i∈JnK
of a dynamic NCG G. Suppose that σ is not an SPE; then there exists a history h of G such
that the residual strategy σh is not an NE.
This implies that for some player i, there exists a strategy σ′i such that costi(σ, h) >
costi(〈σ−i, σ′i〉, h). In particular, costi(〈σ−i, σ′i〉, h) is finite, and along the outcome of this
strategy profile, Player i reaches tgt.
We pick σ′i as a profitable deviating strategy (after history h) with minimum number
of deviations from σi. Because Player i reaches tgt along outcome(〈σ−i, σ′i〉, h), there exist
profitable strategies with finitely many deviations.
We write h′ for the longest finite history along the path outcome(〈σ−i, σ′i〉, h) where σ′i
deviates from σi, i.e, σi(hh′) 6= σ′i(hh′) = c and outcome(σ, hh′c) = outcome(〈σ−i, σ′i〉, hh′c).
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Now if costi(σ, hh′) ≤ costi(〈σ−i, σ′i〉, hh′) holds, then deviating at history hh′ is un-
necessary for Player i for having profitable deviating strategy from h, and that con-
tradicts the minimality of the number of deviations of σ′i from σi. Hence we obtain
costi(σ, hh′) > costi(〈σ−i, σ′i〉, hh′). But that implies we have a first-shot profitable de-
viating strategy for Player i, σ′i, from history hh′, which contradicts to the assumption that
pi is a very-weak SPE. J
Characterization of the outcomes of SPEs. Consider a dynamic NCG 〈A, n〉, and the
associated configuration graph M = 〈C, T 〉. We partition the set C of configurations
into (Xj)0≤j≤n such that a configuration c is in Xj if, and only if, j = #{i ∈ JnK | c(i) = tgt}.
Since tgt is a sink state in A, if there is a transition from some configuration in Xj to some
configuration inXk, then k ≥ j. We defineX≥j =
⋃
i≥j Xi, and Zj = {(c, w, c′) ∈ T | c ∈ Xj}
and Z≥j = {(c, w, c′) ∈ T | c ∈ X≥j}.
We inductively define a sequence of families of labeling functions (λj∗)0≤j≤n, where for
all 0 ≤ j ≤ n, λj∗ = (λj∗i )i∈JnK, and for all i ∈ JnK, λj∗i : Z≥j → N ∪ {−∞,+∞}.
For any family λ = 〈λi〉i∈JnK with λj∗i : Z≥j → N ∪ {−∞,+∞} and any c ∈ X≥j , a path
ρ = (tj)j≥1 from c visiting ctgt is said to be λ-consistent if for any i ∈ JnK and for any
1 ≤ k ≤ |ρ|, it holds costi(ρ≥k) ≤ λi(tk). We write Γλ(c) to denote the set of all λ-consistent
paths from c.
We now define the sequence (λj∗)0≤j≤n. For j = n, we have X≥n = {ctgt} and Z≥n =
{(ctgt, 0n, ctgt)}; there is a single path, which obviously is the outcome of an SPE since no
deviations are possible. For all i ∈ JnK, we let λn∗i (ctgt, 0n, ctgt) = 0.
Now, fix j < n, assuming that λ(j+1)∗ has been defined. In order to define λj∗ , we in-
troduced an intermediary sequence (µki )k≥0,i∈JnK with µki : Z≥j → N ∪ {−∞,+∞}, of which
(λj
∗
i )i∈JnK will be the limit. We call these µk’s as the λj∗- building functions.
Functions µki mainly operate on Zj = Z≥j \ Z≥j+1: for any e ∈ Z≥j+1, we let µki (e) =
λ
(j+1)∗
i (e). Now, for e = (c, w, c′) ∈ Zj , the value µki (e) is defined inductively as follows:
µ0i (e) = 0 if c(i) = tgt, and µ0i (e) = +∞ otherwise;
for k > 0, assuming µk−1i has been defined, we let µki (e) = 0 if c(i) = tgt, and
µki (e) =
 minc′′∈devi(c,c′) supρ∈Γµl−1 (c′′)(costi(c, c
′′) + costi(ρ)) if ∀(c, w˜, c˜) ∈ T, Γµl−1(c˜) 6= ∅
−∞ otherwise
I Lemma C.4. For any e ∈ T , any i ∈ JnK, and any k > 0, we have µki (e) ≤ µk−1i (e).
Proof. We prove the statement by induction on k, starting with k = 1. Write e = (c, w, c′).
If c′ = tgt, then by definition µki (e) = 0 for all k; otherwise, µ0i (e) =∞; in both cases, the
result holds.
Now, let us assume that for some k > 0, the following holds: for all i ∈ JnK and all e ∈ X≥j ,
it holds µli(e) ≤ µl−1i (e). Then for any c ∈ C, it implies Γµk(c, w, c′) ⊆ Γµk−1(c, w, c′).
Fix an arbitrary e = (c, w, c′) ∈ T . For any c′′ ∈ devi(c, c′), by induction hypothesis, we
have Γµk(c′′) ⊆ Γµk−1(c′′).
Then:
sup
ρ∈Γ
µk
(c′′)
(costi(c, c′′) + costi(ρ)) ≤ sup
ρ∈Γ
µk−1 (c′′)
(costi(c, c′′) + costi(ρ)).
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It follows
min
c′′∈devi(c,c′)
sup
ρ∈Γ
µk
(c′′)
(costi(c, c′′)+costi(ρ)) ≤ min
c′′∈devi(c,c′)
sup
ρ∈Γ
µk−1 (c′′)
(costi(c, c′′)+costi(ρ)),
which shows µk(e) ≤ µk−1(e). J
We write Γ∗ for Γλ0∗ . Then:
I Theorem 18. A path ρ in G = 〈A, n〉 is the outcome of an SPE if, and only if, ρ ∈ Γ∗(csrc).
Proof. Let us first consider an SPE σ of G, of which ρ is the outcome. We shall show that
for any history h ending in configuration c, outcome(σ, h) ∈ Γ∗(c). In fact, we prove by
induction on j that outcome(σ, h) ∈ Γλj∗ (c) if c ∈ Xj .
For j = n, for any history h ending in Xn, outcome(σ, h) is a path looping on ctgt.
We defined λn∗(e) = 0 for e ∈ Xn, so that the result holds.
Assume the statement is true for some j + 1 ≤ n: for any history h ending in some
configuration c ∈ Xj+1, outcome(σ, h) ∈ Γ(j+1)∗(c).
To prove the result at level j, we start another induction to show that for any k, for any
history h whose last configuration c is in Xj , the path outcome(σ, h) belongs to Γµk(c).
We begin with the case k = 0. Fix a history h ending in c ∈ Xj . Write outcome(σ, h) =
(cr, wr, cr+1)r≥1. Let r′ be the least integer such that cr′ in outcome(σ, h) belongs to X>j .
We need to show that for any i ∈ JnK and any r, costi((outcome(σ, h))≥r) ≤ µ0i (cr, wr, cr+1).
If r < r′, then either µ0(cr, wr, cr+1) =∞, or µ0(cr, wr, cr+1) = 0 and cr(i) = tgt; in both
cases, the result also holds. If r ≥ r′, we have µ0i (cp, wp, cp+1) = λ(j+1)
∗
i (cp, wp, cp+1), and
by our outer induction hypothesis, costi((outcome(σ, h)≥r)) ≤ λ(j+1)∗(cr, wr, cr+1).
We now prove the induction step. We assume that outcome(σ, h) ∈ Γµk−1(c) for any
history h ending in c ∈ Xj . Write outcome(σ, h) = (cr, wr, cr+1)r≥1. We first observe that
µki (cr, wr, cr+1) 6= −∞ for any r ≥ 1. This is because for any (cr, w˜, c˜) ∈ T and for any
csrc
h˜=⇒ c˜, by our current induction hypothesis Γµk−1(c˜) contains outcome(σ, h˜), hence it is
not empty.
Therefore, the only thing left to show now is that, for all i ∈ JnK, for all r, we have
costi(outcome(σ, h)≥r) ≤ µki (cr, wr, cr+1). This is clear if cr(i) = tgt. As previously, we let
r′ be the least integer such that configuration cr′ along outcome(σ, h) belongs to X>j .
For r < r′: assume costi(outcome(σ, h)≥r) > µki (cr, wr, cr+1); then,
costi(outcome(σ, h)≥r) > min
c′∈devi(cr,cr+1)
sup
ρ∈Γ
µk−1 (c′)
{costi(cr, c′) + costi(ρ)},
which implies the existence of an edge (cr(i), f, v′) in E such that
costi(outcome(σ, h)≥r) > costi(cr, cr+1[i→ v′]) + costi(σ, h · (cr, w′, cr+1[i→ v′])),
because by our inner induction outcome(σ, h · (cr, w′, cr+1[i→ v′])) ∈ Γµk−1(cr, w′, cr+1[i→
v′]). This shows a profitable first-shot deviation for Player i, contradicting to our hypothesis
that σ is an SPE.
Otherwise for r ≥ r′, the condition follows directly from the outer induction hypothesis,
because µk coincides with λj∗ for edges in those regions.
We now prove the converse implication.
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Picking ρ ∈ Γ∗(csrc), we build a very-weak SPE σ = (σi)i∈JnK (which is an SPE by
Theorem C.3), step-by-step; for notational convenience, instead of defining σi(h) for any
history h, we directly define what outcome(σ, h) would be (if not already defined).
As a first step, we let outcome(σ, csrc) = ρ. Now let us construct rest of the σ. We pick
an arbitrary non-initial history h′ = h · (c, w, c′) for which outcome(σ, h′) is not defined;
we assume that outcome(σ, h) is already defined as (cj , wj , cj+1)j≥1 such that c′ 6= c2.
If there exists i1 6= i2 ∈ JnK such that c′(ij) 6= c2(ij) for both j = 1 and j = 2, then pick
any ρ˜ ∈ Γ∗(c′) (which we know is not empty) and define outcome(σ, h · (c, w, c′)) = ρ˜.
Otherwise c2 differs from c′ only at a single player’s position, say Player i’s. In that case
we define
outcome(σ, h · (c, w, c′)) = arg max
ρ∈Γ∗(c′)
{costi(c1, c′) + costi(ρ)} (2)
Note that, here we can take arg max because λ∗i (e) is finite (which we shall establish in
Corollary C.9) for any e ∈ E , so there are finitely many plays in Γ∗(c). This ends our
definition of the strategy profile σ, which we now prove is an SPE.
Consider an arbitrary history h and denote outcome(σ, h) by (cj , wj , cj+1)1≤j . Pick a
configuration c′ such that (c1, w′, c′) ∈ T , c′(j) = c2(j) for all j 6= i, but c′(i) 6= c2(i). That
is, c′ is a configuration obtained by Player i’s deviation from σi at the end of h.
We show that such a single player deviation is not beneficial if, after that deviation, all
players continue to play following σ:
costi(c1, c′) + costi(σ, h · (c1, w′, c′)) = sup
ρ∈Γ∗(c′)
{costi(ρ) + costi(c1, c′)} (by (2))
≥ min
c˜∈devi(c1,c2)
sup
ρ∈Γ∗(c˜)
{costi(ρ) + costi(c, c˜)}
= λ∗i ((c1, w1, c2))
≥ costi(σ, h)
So no such configuration c′ would be beneficial for Player i. Hence from any history h, σ
is very-weak NE. Therefore, we can conclude that σ is an SPE. J
Counter Graph. Having this correspondence between outcomes of SPE and Γ∗-paths, our
job to decide existence of SPE now reduces to checking non-emptiness of Γ∗(csrc). To this aim,
with any such family µ = 〈µi〉i∈JnK and configuration c, we associate an infinite-state counter
graph C[µ, c] = 〈C ′, T ′〉 to capture µ-consistent paths from c:
the set of vertices is C ′ = C × (N ∪ {+∞})JnK
T ′ contains all edges ((d, b), w, (d′, b′)) such that (d,w, d′) is an edge of M and for
all i ∈ JnK, either b′(i) = 0 if d(i) = tgt, or b′i = min{bi − wi, µi(d,w, d′)− wi} otherwise
(provided that b′i ≥ 0 for all i, in order for (d′, b′) to be an edge of C[µ, c]).
Intuitively, in configuration (d, b), b is used to enforce µ-consistency: each edge taken along
a path imposes a constraint on the cost of the players for the rest of the path; this constraint
is added to the constraints of the earlier edges, and propagated along the path.
With the initial configuration c, we associate bc such that bci = 0 if c(i) = tgt and bci = +∞
otherwise: this configuration imposes no constraints since no edges have been taken yet.
Notice that C[µ, c] is infinite, but as we show below, only finitely many states are reachable
from the initial configuration. We write |C ′|r for the number of reachable states in C ′.
We extend region decomposition ofM = 〈C, T 〉 to any counter graph C[µ, c] = 〈C ′, T ′〉
in the natural way: (c′, b′) ∈ X ′j if c′ ∈ Xj , and an edge ((c′, b′), w′, (c′′, b′′)) ∈ Z ′≥j if
(c′, w′, c′′) ∈ Z≥j .
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We call a path pi from (c, bc) to (ctgt, b) (for some b) as a valid path in C[µ, c]. For any
path pi ∈ C[µ, c], (where c ∈ Xj), we write pi = pi[j] · pi[j + 1] · · ·pi[n] where pi[l] denotes
the (possibly empty) section of path in Z ′l . We also use the notation maxbl(µ, c) to denote
the maximum finite counter value that appears in the vertices reachable from (c, bc) and
belonging to X ′j : more precisely,
maxbl(µ, c) = max{m ∈ N | ∃(c′, b′) ∈ Xl s.t. (c, bc)→∗ (c′, b′) and ∃i ∈ JnK. b′(i) = m}.
We extend this notation to maxb≥l(µ, c), which denotes maxl≥j maxbl(µ, c). When all the
counter values are in {0,∞}, we take maxbl(µ, c) = 0.
I Lemma C.5. There exists a path pi = ((cj , bj), wj(cj+1, bj+1))j from (c, bc) to a vertex
(ctgt, b) (for some b) in the counter graph C[λ, c] = 〈C ′, T ′〉 of G if, and only if, there is a
λ-consistent path ρ = (cj , wj , cj+1)j from c in G.
Proof. Assume that such a path pi exists. Along pi, for each player i, let k(i) be the least
index such that ck(i)(i) = tgt. Then it is enough to show that for 1 ≤ k < k(i), we have
costi(ρ≥k) ≤ λi(ck, wk, ck+1). And indeed we have
0 ≤ bk(i)(i) ≤ bk(i)−1(i)− costi(ck(i)−1, ck(i))
≤ bk(i)−2(i)− costi(ck(i)−2, ck(i)−1)− costi(ck(i)−1, ck(i))
...
≤ bk+1(i)−
k(i)−1∑
j=k+1
costi(cj , cj+1)
so that costi(ρ≥k) ≤ bk+1(i) ≤ λi(ck, wk, ck+1),
Conversely, if there is a λ-consistent path ρ = (cj , wj , cj+1)1≤j<|ρ| from c, we define
pi = ((cj , bj), wj , (cj+1, bj+1))1≤j<|ρ| with:
b1(i) =
{
0 if c1(i) = tgt
+∞ otherwise
bj(i) = min{bj−1(i)− costi(cj−1, cj), λi(cj−1, wj−1, cj)− costi(cj−1, cj)} for 1 < j < |ρ|
For pi to be a valid path in C[λ, c], we have to prove that bj(i) ≥ 0 for all 1 < j ≤ |ρ| and all
i ∈ JnK. For j = 1, it is evident.
For j > 1, the second element of the minimum defining bj(i) is non-negative, because
costi(cj−1, cj) ≤ costi(ρ≥j−1) ≤ λi(cj−1, wj−1, cj). Suppose the first element bj−1(i) −
costi(cj−1, cj) is negative. Using definition of bj−1(i), we can say the above inequality
can be true only if either bj−2(i) −
∑j−1
k=j−2 costi(ck, ck+1) < 0, or λi(cj−2, wj−2, cj−1) −∑j−1
k=j−2 costi(ck, ck+1) < 0. But again the latter cannot be true because it directly
contradicts λ-consistency of ρ. Hence, our supposition can only be true if the former
constraint holds. We repeat the process with bj−2(i), coming down to the condition
b2(i)−
∑j−1
k=2 costi(ck, wk, ck+1) < 0 to make our supposition bj−1(i)−costi(cj−1, cj) < 0 true.
But b2(i) = λi(c1, w1, c2)− costi(c1, c2), so that the inequality above entails λi(c1, w1, c2) <
j−1∑
k=1
costi(ck, ck+1). This contradicts λ-consistency condition at the beginning of ρ. It follows
that bj(i) ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ |ρ| and all i ∈ JnK. J
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I Lemma C.6. supρ∈Γ
µk
(c) costi(ρ) = +∞ if, and only if, there exists a valid path pi
in C[µk, c] with the following conditions:
pi is of the form h · β · h′, where β is a cycle in C[µk, c];
Player i’s (constant) counter value b(i) is positive throughout β.
Proof. supρ∈Γ
µk
(c) costi(ρ) = +∞ implies there exists a sequence of paths (ρm)m≥1 in Γµk(c)
such that costi(ρ) → ∞ as m grows. By Lemma C.5, for each of those ρm, there exists
corresponding pim from (c, bc) to (ctgt, b) in C[µk, c]. As a player’s cost in a single edge is
bounded, the length of pim has to grow unboundedly. First of all, that is only possible if
there is a cycle β in C[µk, c] - we have the first condition now. Now Player i’s counter value
cannot be 0 in β because then the cycle doesn’t contribute to make costi(ρ)→ 0. Thus the
second condition also holds true.
Conversely, for pi = h ·β ·h′ in C[µk, c], where β is a cycle and Player i’s cost > 0 in β, we
construct a sequence of paths pim = h ·βm+1 ·h′ for m ≥ 0. By Lemma C.5, corresponding to
this sequence of paths, there exists a sequence of paths (ρm)m≥0 in Γµk−1(c′′), and for those
paths, costi(ρm)→∞ as m grows. Hence, µki (c, w, c′) = +∞ if these condition holds. J
I Lemma C.7. For any edge e = (c, w, c′) ∈ Zj, the (|V |+ 1)-st family µ|V | of λj∗-building
functions satisfies µ|V |i (e) ≤ |V | × κ, where κ = maxe∈Efe(n).
Proof. We prove a slightly stronger statement. Let m be the length of the shortest path
from c(i) to tgt in A. We show (by induction) that µmi (e) ≤ m × κ. As m ≤ |V | and by
Lemma C.4, this entails our current lemma.
If m = 1, then there is an edge e from c[i] to tgt in A. Let us consider an edge
e′ = (c, w′, c′′) such that c′′[j] = c′[j] for all j 6= i, and c′′[i] = tgt. Now if Γµm−1(c˜) = ∅
for any (c, w˜, c˜) ∈ T , then anyway µmi (e) = −∞, and the result holds. Otherwise, we have
Γµm−1(c′′) 6= ∅, and for any ρ ∈ Γµm−1(c′′), we have costi(ρ) = 0. Therefore, µmi (e) =
costi(c, c′′), which is bounded by κ.
Now assume that the induction hypothesis holds up to step m − 1, and consider a
configuration c such that the length of a shortest path from c(i) to tgt in A is m. Fix an
edge (c, w, c′) ∈ T . Write (c(i), f, v′) ∈ E for the first edge of a shortest path from c(i)
to tgt. We consider a configuration c′′ such that c′′(j) = c′(j) for all j 6= i, and c′′(i) = v′.
By construction, there is a path from c′′(i) to tgt of length ≤ m−1. By induction hypothesis,
for any edge (c′′, w˜, c˜) ∈ T , we have µm−1i ((c′′, w˜, c˜)) ≤ (m − 1) × κ. This implies for any
path ρ = (tj)j≥1 ∈ Γµm−1(c′′), we have costi(ρ) ≤ µm−1i (t1) ≤ (m − 1) × κ. Therefore,
µmi (c, w, c′) ≤ costi(c, c′′) + (m− 1)× κ ≤ m× κ. J
Lemmas C.4 and C.7 provide a bound on the number of steps until any sequence of
λj
∗ -computing functions stabilize:
I Corollary C.8. Any sequence (µk)k≥0 of λj
∗-computing functions stabilizes after at most
|V |(1 + n · κ · |E|n) steps.
From Lemma C.7, we also get that the sequence (µk)k≥0 built for computing λj
∗ cannot
stabilize unless for all i ∈ JnK, for all e ∈ Z≥j , we have µki (e) ≤ |V | × κ. By Lemma C.4:
I Corollary C.9. For any 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n, and any e ∈ Z≥j, we have λj∗i (e) ≤ |V | × κ.
At this point, we have bounded the finite values that λj∗ ’s can take. But in the
transitioning from λ(j+1)∗ to λj∗ , µki can take larger values when k < |V |. In the sequel, we
bound the values that any family µk = 〈µki 〉i∈JnK can return.
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To this aim, we begin with working on the supremum of the cost for Player i of the paths
in Γµk(c).
When we consider a maxbl(µk, c) with c ∈ Xj ofM, it is implicit that l ≥ j. For l > j,
we have
maxbl(µk, c) ≤ maxbl(µ0, c) ≤ maxe∈Zl
i∈JnK
λl
∗
i (e) ≤ |V | × κ
because µki (e) = µ0i (e) = λl
∗
i (e) for those e ∈ Z≥l and for all i ∈ JnK. So it remains to bound
maxbj(µk, c); but for that too, when k ≥ |V |, we have maxbj(µk, c) ≤ |V | × κ. Therefore,
we only need to provide a bound for maxbj(µk, c) when k < |V |.
I Lemma C.10. For an edge e = (c, w, c′) ∈ Zj and a λj∗-building function µk = 〈µki 〉i∈JnK,
if µki (e) is non-zero finite then it holds
µki (e) ≤ (n|C|+ 2|V |)×
k∑
l=1
(n|C|)l−1 · κl
Moreover, the above bound also applies to maxbj(µk, c′′) for any c′′ ∈ Xj:
maxbj(µk, c) ≤ (n|C|+ 2|V |)×
k∑
l=1
(n|C|)l−1 · κl.
Proof. We can claim that the finite maximum counter value appeared in X ′j of any counter
graph C[µk, c′′] (where c ∈ Xj) is bounded by the finite maximum µki (e) value appeared the
same region (maximum over i and e ∈ Zj), i.e,
maxbj(µk, c′′) ≤ max{µki (c, w, c) ∈ N | ((c, b), w, (c′, b′)) ∈ Z ′j of C[µk, c′′], i ∈ JnK}.
This is justified because for the initial vertex (c, bc) of X ′j , bc ∈ {0,∞}. Hence, a counter
value becomes non-zero finite, when some µki (e) for e ∈ Zj becomes non-zero finite. But
by definition of counter graph, ((c, b), w, (c′, b′)) ∈ Z ′j implies (c, w, c′) ∈ Zj , hence we can
obtain,
maxbj(µk, c′′) ≤ max{µki (c, w, c′) ∈ N | (c, w, c′) ∈ Zj , i ∈ JnK}
By induction on k, we prove that for any c′′ ∈ Xj and any i ∈ JnK,
maxbj(µk, c′′) ≤ max{µki (e) ∈ N | e ∈ Zj} ≤ (n|C|+ 2|V |)×
k∑
l=1
(n|C|)l−1 · κl.
As µ0i (e) ∈ {0,∞} for all ∈Zj , the given bounds hold for k = 0.
We fix an arbitrary e = (c, w, c′) ∈ Zj and a player i ∈ JnK such that µki (e) ∈ N\{0}. That
µki (e) is a non-zero finite value means that supρ∈Γµk−1(c˜) costi(ρ) ∈ N for some c˜ ∈ devi(c, c′).
If c˜(i) = tgt then supρ∈Γ
µk−1 (c˜)
costi(ρ) = 0, and that makes µki (e) ≤ costi(c, c˜) ≤ κ,
satisfying the given bound.
Otherwise, c˜(i) 6= tgt, and depending whether c˜ belongs to Xj or X>j , we analyze two
cases:
c˜ ∈ Xl for some l > j: Then
µki (e) ≤ sup
ρ∈Γ
µk−1 (c˜)
{costi(c, c˜) + costi(ρ)}
≤ costi(c, c˜) + max
e′∈Zl
i∈JnK
µk−1i (e′) ≤ (1 + |V |)× κ.
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c˜ ∈ Xj : Now consider C[µk−1, c˜], and its initial vertex (c˜, bc˜). By Lemma C.5, for any
path ρ ∈ Γµk−1(c˜), we have a corresponding valid path piρ in C[µk−1, c˜]. We also consider
the region decomposition piρ = piρ[j] . . . piρ[n]. From the fact that supρ∈Γ
µk−1 (c˜)
< +∞,
we argue that in piρ, from (c˜, bc˜) within each |C| step either one counter value strictly
decreases, or Player i reaches the tgt. Otherwise, there would have been a cycle in
C[µk−1, c˜] resulting the supremum +∞ ( thanks to lemma C.6). Recall by design, counter
values of piρ in X ′j lie in Jmaxbj(µk−1, c˜)K∪ {0,+∞}, and when a counter value decreases
along an edge, it decreases at least by 1. Therefore, within n× |C| × (maxbj(µk−1, c˜) + 1)
steps from (c˜, bc˜) at least one of the counter value becomes 0. When a player-l counter
value becomes 0, piρ must reaches the next region (making the corresponding c(l) = tgt),
otherwise piρ is not a valid path. Moreover, from the next region, costi(ρ[j + 1] . . . ρ[n])
is bounded by µk−1i (e′), where e′ denotes the first edge of ρ which belongs to Z>j .
Therefore,
costi(ρ) ≤ (n× |C| × (maxbj(µk−1, c˜) + 1))× κ+ max
l>j
maxbl(µk−1, c˜)
≤ (n× |C|+ |V |)× κ+ (n× |C|)×maxbj(µk−1, c˜)× κ.
If Player i reaches tgt within X ′j , costi(ρ) would be much smaller. In the above, we have
used the bound from corollary C.9 as µk−1(e) = λl∗(e) for e ∈ Xl for l > j. Now as
c˜ ∈ Xj , we can use induction hypothesis for giving bound to maxbj(µk−1, c˜). As the
above shown bound works for any ρ ∈ Γµk−1(c˜), it works for the supremum too, hence we
have
µki (c, w, c′) ≤ sup
ρ∈Γ
µk−1 (c˜)
costi(c′, c˜) + costi(ρ)
≤ |V | × κ+ (n× |C|+ |V |)× κ+ (n× |C|)×maxbj(µk−1, c˜)× κ
≤ (n|C|+ 2|V |)× κ+ (n|C| × κ)× {(n|C|+ 2|V |)×
k−1∑
l=1
(n|C|)l−1 · κl
= (n|C|+ 2|V |)×
k∑
l=1
(n|C|)l−1 · κl
J
This ends having bound for any maxbl(µ, c) for any λj
∗ -building function µ, c ∈ Xj , and
l ≥ j. Hence, we can conclude that the counter graph C[µ, c] = 〈C ′, T ′〉 can be made finite,
by taking C ′ = {(d, b) ∈ C × ([0;Y ] ∪ {+∞})JnK | c ⇒∗ d}, with Y = n|V | · |V |n.|V | · κ|V |,
which is doubly-exponential in the encoding of n. Note that, this makes |C ′|r at most
double-exponential too - which will be one of the key arguments in the complexity analysis
of the final algorithm.
Algorithm. Now we describe in details how we check non-emptiness of Γλ∗(csrc). Starting
from λn∗ , we inductively compute λj∗ = 〈λj∗i 〉i∈JnK. When computing λj∗ , we use an
intermediary induction (following the definition): we initialize with the definition of µ0 =
〈µ0i 〉i∈JnK. Then, assuming we have already computed {µk−1i (e) | e ∈ T}, a general step to
compute µki (c, w, c′) is as follows:
First we need to check that µki (c, w, c′) is −∞. For that, we check, one by one, whether
for each of (c, w′, c′′) ∈ T , Γµk−1(c′′) is not ∅. In order to do that,we guess a valid path
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(but do not store) in C[µk−1, c′′]. If there is such a path in C[µk−1, c′′], there will be
one, length of which is bounded by |C|, which is doubly-exponential in the size of input.
Hence we keep a counter which we increase by 1 every time we correctly guess a new edge
along the path, and the counter stops either when we reach a (ctgt, b), or at the latest
when it crosses |C| marks - this counter requires exponential space to encode.
if the previous check failed, we know that µki (c, w, c′) would be in N ∪ {+∞}.
We now check if µki (c, w, c′) = +∞. For that we need to verify the conditions stated in
Lemma C.6, i.e, for each c′′ ∈ devi(c, c′), we guess a valid path pi of the form h · β · h′ in
C[µk−1, c′′], where β is a cycle and Player i’s counter value is > 0 inside β.
We first guess the first vertex of β, say (c1, b1) (with b1(i) > 0), from which the cycle
starts, then guess a cycle on (c1, b1), keeping only the current edge in memory. Now if
there is a cycle on (c1, b1), there has to be a cycle within |C| length because within a
cycle no counter value can change. Then we guess a path from (c′′, bc′′) to (c1, b1), and
another path from (c1, b1) to (ctgt, b) (for some b). The length of the part up to (c1, b1) is
bounded by |C ′|r, whilst we can always get a path of length at most |C| (if a path exists)
from (c1, b1) to (c, b). This discrepancy between two bounds is mainly because for the
latter part of the path, we do not exactly fix the final vertex for the latter part (b can be
any tuple of n nonnegative values), we just want the first component to be ctgt, while for
the former part it gets fixed to (c1, b1) when we guessed earlier.
If we can guess such a path pi for each of c′′ ∈ devi(c, c′), we return µki (c, w, c′) = +∞.
otherwise, we have at least 1 and at most |V | many configurations c′′ ∈ devi(c, c′) such
that supρ∈Γ
µk−1 (c′′)
costi(ρ) ∈ N. We call this set of configurations as devi(c, c′)|finsup
To compute the finite value of µki (c, w, c′), we compute Mj = supρ∈Γµk−1 (c′′j ) costi(ρ) for
each of c′′j ∈ devi(c, c′)|finsup, and then take the minimum. In order to compute Mj ,
we first tentatively set Mj = mine∈E fe(1), and proceed iteratively as follows: we guess a
valid path pi of length at most |C ′|r of C[µk−1, c′′j ] such that costi(ρ) ≥ Mj , where ρ is
the corresponding path of pi in G. If such a path exists, we increase Mj by 1, and repeat.
At some point, we get Mj such that there doesn’t exist a valid path pi of length at most
|C ′|r with Player i’s cost larger than or equal to Mj + 1, but there exists a valid path
with Player i’s cost larger than or equal to Mj . We store that Mj .
When all valuesMj have been computed, we returnM = minj∈J|devi(c,c′)|finsup|K{costi(c, c′′j )+
Mj}. We use at most doubly-exponential space in the procedure of guessing a path, and
we reuse that space for guessing next path in the above algorithm.
We keep another binary counter throughout transitioning from µk−1 to µk to flag whether
the fixpoint has been reached. Once we reach λ∗ = 〈λ∗i 〉, we finally check whether Γλ∗(csrc)
is empty by guessing a path in C[λ∗, csrc] from (csrc, bcsrc) to (ctgt, b).
In conclusion, we use doubly-exponential space: (1) to store {µk−1i (e) | i ∈ JnK, e ∈ T}
which is double-exponential in the encoding of the number of players, and (2) to encode a
counter which keeps checking whether the length of our guessed paths does not exceed |C ′|r.
I Theorem 19. The existence of SPEs in a dynamic NCG can be decided in 2EXPSPACE.
